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Abstract 
Social theories of knowledge necessarily emphasise context and relativism. They are grounded in a specific 
situation or community. Where they seek to use such a grounding to approach a concept of general or 
objective knowledge they tend to either be unsatisfying in philosophical depth, or to turn on questions of 
the relative power of groups. In the latter case violence, whether directly physical, social or structural plays 
a crucial part in determining whose truth prevails. These models do not help us to understand the 
persistence and survival of specific forms of knowledge-making and their institutions, particularly those of 
the western scholarly tradition and its conception of the university. I will argue that the western academic 
system has shown persistence by institutionalising particular forms of conflict in a way that makes them 
productive. Our culture and institutions reproduce communities and boundaries, and create arenas in 
which particular forms of conflict are conducted under specific, yet frequently tacit, rules. Part of these 
forms is an orientation, or aspiration, towards openness that is always imperfectly realised but 
continuously creates new grounds for conflict. Our institutions struggle to evolve in response but have 
largely succeeded over the longer term. I will explore one example of this in the changing assumptions 
around peer review that have developed in response to online commentary on formal research outputs. 
Knowledge, Groups, Power, Violence 
Broadly speaking, theories of knowledge can work from the outside-in, working from an external truth to 
our experience of it, or inside-out, from local groups and individual experiences to how those are shared, 
are applied and spread. Practical questions of how to manage and optimise knowledge production are 
questions where social models of knowledge are likely to be the most useful. However, these models, 
again broadly, tend to a number of failings. They can be unsatisfying in their analytical power. Ravetz’s 
(1971) model of the social production of scientific knowledge is satisfying as a description of much of 
what happens, but provides little in the way of analytical instrumentation to dissect what is “good” 
knowledge. Collins and Evans (2017) make the epistemological shallowness of their arguments a virtue in 
their political goal of institutionalising expertise in the “elective modernist” society they envision. 
The alternative to such apparently shaky foundations sometimes appears to be that such questions are 
ascribed merely to power differentials between groups. It is clear that there are many examples in which 
social – or physical – power was the determining factor. More than this it is clear that many of the 
important constructs of our current knowledge frameworks, the canon(s) of literature and art, the 
narrative of great discoveries by great (white, western, male) geniuses that underpins not just how we 
teach science but the scaffolding on which we build theory are largely determined by historical  accidents 
of power, or by tribalism. 
If knowledge is to be open and progressive in the sense that Popper offers then such a prominent role for 
power, and indeed the violence that necessarily follows its exercise, is disquieting. Can we reconcile social 
production of knowledge within groups, and its productive sharing amongst groups, with such an 
apparent necessity for violent competition? 
Institutions and Evolution 
An alternative, or at least a refinement, of violent inter-group conflict is provided by evolutionary models. 
Barbara Hernnstein Smith (1988) and Bruno Latour (2004), each in their own ways provide models of 
knowledge that expand social production through focussing on interactions. Hernnstein Smith in her 
discussion of the “Language Loop” articulates an evolutionary model of understanding in which we build 
entrained sets of actions to meaning and response based on shared experience. Latour argues for an 
institutionalised cycle of exploration-interrogation-ordering-inclusion (or exclusion) through which the 
collective grows.  
Evolutionary models allow us to examine the question of what works, which groups succeed and to seek 
patterns between them. Many of these patterns will involve power relations. But we can also get beyond 
this to understand other contributions. What cultural forms are common, what institutions support 
longevity? As Pierson (2004) notes this requires careful attention to time-spans. The patterns we can see 
can be determined by the time-scales we choose to look at. Underlying causes of change that are slow are 
easily missed in favour of local triggers that appear to be causal but are merely a signal that some threshold 
has been breached. 
It follows then that it is valuable to examine institutions of knowledge production that are, or at least we 
believe to be, long standing. Institutions (in the broadest sense of organising sets of implicit and explicit 
rules of action) because the problem of knowledge dissemination is one of ​coordination​ amongst groups. 
Long standing because survival implies stability and success, and because an examination of how these 
institutions have adapted to change will be informative. If it turns out in fact that the institutions we 
believe to be long-standing are actually not, or at least not in the way we have learnt to believe, this is even 
more informative. 
Arguably the two longest standing institutions in the western academy are the university and peer review. 
The University as an organisational unit (adapted in turn from forms developed in the Arabic world and 
the western monastic institutions) has provided the physical and economic infrastructure for supporting 
knowledge production in Western Europe for over a thousand years. Through periods of expansion (and 
rarer periods of contraction) universities have come to take a central role in society, as John Hartley (2018) 
notes in another paper in this issue as sites of cultural reproduction of society. The universities of today 
are, however, not the universities of the past. They have adapted successfully to fundamental changes in 
society, economics, governance, even our understanding of the world itself.  
Clearly power had a role to play here but are there other aspects of institutional design that are important? 
Universities have been sites of conflict, both intellectual but also physical (think of Paris in 1832 and 1968) 
for their entire history. They are sites where the exercise of power meets new challengers (UC Berkeley in 
the 1960s and more recently in the student occupations of 2011) in physical confrontation, but also in the 
inevitable turnover of established staff and views with new generations of scholars with new ideas and a 
new point to prove (until, inevitably, they become the establishment in turn). 
Peer review is a much more complex case. Both much older, and much newer than is generally thought 
peer review as an institutionalised practice is what glues the academy together. “Scholarly” work is defined 
by its exposure to “peer review”. Neither term is well defined, either in theory or in practice but together 
they define the boundary walls of our community. This institutionalising of review by professional peers 
as the defining characteristic of scholarly work is actually very recent, dating no earlier than the 1960s or 
70s (Pontille and Torny, 2014, Czisar, 2016, Baldwin, 2017, Tennant et al, 2017).  
That this fact is so unsettling, even threatening to our self-identity as scholars, is very instructive. At the 
same time the process of criticism by relevant experts is much older. Merton (1942), lacking the term 
“peer review” because it was not to be coined for another 20 years adopts “organized skepticism” as one 
of his four norms because it reflects an older practice. Selection for public-making, whether in print or at a 
meeting, as well as ultimately for the greatest prize of membership is central to the prestige of the UK’s 
Royal Society from at least the 18th century (Fyfe and Moxham, 2016).  Robert Boyle (1662) values (or at 
least publicly claims to value) criticism from his peers, even those he had no previous knowledge of and 
Willinksy (2018) has traced the value placed on criticism amongst monastic writers back a further 
millennium. What is common throughout this 1500-year history of scepticism is that it is organised. There 
are always ​rules​. 
Arenas of productive conflict 
Universities are peculiar organisations. It has been noted that the modern university is neither well 
managed from the perspective of a corporatised producer of utility, nor as a public institution dedicated to 
the “pure” pursuit of knowledge (David, 2014). Readings (1996) famously and contentiously laments that 
the modern university is “in ruins”. The modern critique of the neo-liberal metricised institution relies on 
its rhetorical power for a vision of the “true university” of the past, which of course relied entirely for its 
publicly-funded glory on the mass exclusion of participants based on class, race or gender to keep system 
costs down. 
Part of the sustainability of the university is precisely is that it is a centre of establishment power. The 
“beacon of knowledge” that underpins the enlightenment places the university, learning, study as 
institutions and practices that reinforce existing structures and relations. At the same time the 
(aspirational, never fully realised) notion of that knowledge as a light “for all” could hardly be better 
designed to provide an arena where that power is challenged. Universities were sites for ferment and 
rebellion when they were only available to children of the aristocracy. Their adoption by the middle classes 
led in some cases to armed rebellion (again, Paris) and more measured (but not always less violent) 
examples such as the student occupations of British university buildings in response to the introduction of 
fees. Today, having assumed a societal mission to deliver social mobility and inclusion, universities are 
grappling with massive mismatches of expectations, cultures and capabilities.  
None of this is new. Once universities took on the mantle of being centres of enlightenment knowledge, 
that was by its nature “universal”, they were necessarily sites where the “unenlightened” would journey. At 
the same time as being a centre for the reproduction and transmission of British culture, Oxford and 
Cambridge were (and remain in many cases through institutions such as the Rhodes Scholarships) places 
where colonial bumpkins aspired to attend first to become part of that culture, and then to poke and 
provoke it.  Again, Willinksy has traced this history deeper to the monastic and religious establishments 
that were literal sites of pilgrimage for scholars attracting a more diverse (at least for the time) community 
with different histories, expectations and cultures. In that sense at least, the cathedral ​was​ the bazaar. 
If the university created arenas for conflict through attracting new participants then it has also excelled at 
creating internal opportunities for circumscribed and rule-bound conflict. The division of scholars into 
departments and specialisms, while requiring interactions across such disciplinary divisions over critical 
questions of governance and resource allocation might seem calculated to create conflict. Within 
departments and schools however there is not homogeneity but diversity of expertise. Indeed the process 
of appointing new members to departments is often one of a filling a gap, a question of representation for 
which existing members are, by definition, unlikely to be expert in determining the quality of applicants. 
Faculties are tribal, departments are tribal, and groups within departments are tribal.  
At the same time the functions of the university require ongoing contact, discourse and the resolution of 
problems across those divisions. The social institutions of the university, high tables and graduations, 
organising teaching or agreeing new appointments, or even supporting the football team enforce a 
requirement for lateral interactions. They also provide a shared, also tribal – connective in Hartley’s 
terminology – language that binds the university and is impenetrable to an outsider, as anyone who has 
been invited without warning to an Oxbridge College High Table dinner or a US college football match 
can attest.  
The case of sport is instructive. It also constructs an arena, with rules and requirements, in which there is 
conflict between universities. Other arenas, those of prestige and profile, attracting famous scholars, 
revenue and rankings have their own rules. All of these have in common the way that they contribute to 
the identity of scholars and their identification with the university. These affiliations cut across disciplinary 
communities and each of the social forms, each of the arenas where differing groups meet have their own 
ground-rules and scope. 
Peer Review as an Institution that Manages Conflict 
The idea of peer review as stylised combat is a running a joke for the academy, perhaps best illustrated by 
the well known cartoon showing the scholar preparing to run the gauntlet of six heavily armed reviewers 
to achieve their goal of “paper accepted” (Figure 1). As always, humour surfaces an underlying sense of 
what is really happening here. 
 
Figure 1. A humorous but revealing illustration of the community view of peer review.​ Image 
originally from ​Strange Matter​ by Nick D Kim. Used with permission. For conditions of use see 
https://web.archive.org/web/20130625043008/http://strange-matter.net/ 
   
Ray Spier, writing in an editorial in Trends in Biotechnology in 2002 writes: 
The peer-review process is a turf battle with the ultimate prize of the knowledge, science or doctrine being published. 
On the one side, we have the writers and originators of ideas, on the other, we have the editors and critics. 
However, he ends his abstract with the claim that “It was not always so” with echoes of the belief in a 
prelapsarian university described above, that there was once a golden age of “proper” peer review. The 
history is far more complex. It is now well established that the term “peer review” itself is a relatively 
recent coinage, dating approximately to the 1960s and originally used to refer to selection of grants for 
funding rather than publication (Baldwin, 2017). 
The history of selection (and rejection) via processes that sometimes included feedback and revision has a 
much longer history. The establishment of the Committee on Papers for the Royal Society’s journals is 
often used as a marker, and processes that look more or less familiar can be traced at least into the 19th 
century. What is recent, dating from the 60s or 70s at the earliest, is two coupled ideas: first, that having 
passed “peer review” is the defining characteristic of that literature that we accept as “scholarly”; second 
that “peer review” has a common form across the academy in which an editor passes a submission to 
some number of external reviewers to provide advice on its acceptability for publication and 
recommendations on changes (Tennant et al, 2017). 
The first point justifies the importance of peer review as a core part of our identity as scholars, part of the 
repertoire (Ankeny and Leonelli, 2016) that is learnt as part of our identity construction as members of the 
relevant disciplinary community of practice (Lave and Wenger, 1991). The second, however is the crucial 
one for the current argument. This mode of conflict is to be bound by known rules. In this case the 
conflict between two groups, authors and referees, is to be adjudicated by the editor. 
Those rules are contextual and contain both explicit and implicit elements. What is tacit is often the 
disciplinary differences, which is important in maintaining the myth that peer review is a consistent, shared 
and community defining activity. But the importance of those rules, explicit and implicit can be seen in the 
furore that results when they are broken.  
While we are generally limited to extreme cases for failures that have been made public any scholar will 
have access to a treasure trove of anecdote on less extreme cases. Humour and jokes around peer review, 
for example the canonical vindictiveness of “Referee #2” (or it seems in some disciplines #3) can also 
provide a valuable source of insight into what is expected. Sometimes as in the case of publicly collected 
extracts from severely critical reports the two are combined. 
Peer review, in its modern form as a core defining characteristic of scholarly work, is clearly an institution 
in the sense described by Ostrom (2005). Further than this it is an institution that defines and controls a 
form of conflict. In its idealised form it manages a process in which different groups, that would 
otherwise decide primacy through the direct display of power, or perhaps even violence, are deliberately 
brought into contact in a way that is intended to achieve the same ends more productively, and in a way 
that (at least partially) separates the issue at hand from imbalances of power. It is in this sense an 
institution that manages “staged conflict” in the form advanced by Hartley and Potts (2016; Hartley, 2018) 
to describe the interaction between groups. 
Ideally we would dissect the history of this institution, and its growth to dominance in the mid to late 20th 
century as a way of understanding the process of institutionalisation, and a way of tracing how the more 
disordered processes of conflict that preceded it were converted into this new, more unified, form. 
Unfortunately, historical analysis of peer review processes is challenging, particularly the shift from a set 
of disparate activities which did not apparently require a name to the more institutionalised form. 
Documentary records of processes are weak and scattered. As Aileen Fyfe has observed (personal 
communication), the best source of information would be from author guidelines that were generally 
printed on the inside back cover of printed journals, largely lost when the journals were bound and 
therefore inaccessible to past and present digitisation projects. Pontille and Torny (2014, 2015) have 
examined editorials in specific sociology journals and identified a more complex history than might be 
expected, particularly with respect to the question of double and single-blind reviewing. A cultural history 
of peer review and its broader place in research evaluation from 1945 onwards is a massive but very 
necessary project for the future. 
Technology changes the arena and the rules 
Although we are not in a position to do a detailed analysis of the development of peer review as an 
institution, we do have good examples of its changes in response to technology. Following from Ostrom’s 
(2005) Institutional Analysis and Design model, we can expect an institution to be destabilised by new 
technological capabilities where these come into contact. If these institutions are managing arenas of 
productive conflict amongst and between groups and different scales then we would predict a number of 
responses.  
Some groups may quietly adopt new technological capacities without much visible difficulty. Some groups 
will respond badly to the application of “new rules” and in particular new “arenas” being opened up for 
this conflict. We would also predict that these new arenas will be less productive, generating greater heat 
and more visible forms of violence. All of these are visible in various cases where the technological 
capabilities of the world wide web have been brought to bear on different problematic cases of traditional 
peer review. 
In 2010 an article was placed online in the journal ​Science​ (Wolfe-Simons et al, 2010) that made startling 
claims . The article claimed to show that a bacterium isolated from a hot spring was capable of 
incorporating arsenic in the place of phosphorus in the backbone of its DNA. Such a discovery had 
profound implications for the possible forms of alien life. It was also difficult to understand in terms of 
chemistry, as the backbone with arsenic would be expected to be extremely fragile, breaking down in 
solution in seconds. 
Like many startling claims made previously, the article provoked wide discussion. Unlike most previous 
cases that discussion happened very synchronously, both because the article was available to anyone with 
an internet connection at the same time, and crucially because it happened in the relatively new public 
spaces provided by social media. Yeo et al. (2017) present a timeline of the social media conflagration that 
gives a sense of the scale and confusion that arose. Particularly noteworthy was the contribution of Rosie 
Redfield, Professor of Zoology at the University of British Columbia and an early and prolific blogger on 
both her scientific work and issues of scientific communication and reproducibility. Redfield and her 
research group first strongly criticised the claims, and then proceeded to test them. While these tests were 
eventually published in a traditional form (Reaves et al., 2012) they were originally posted in more or less 
real time to her blog (see for example Redfield, 2012).  
The technology of the web made this ‘post publication peer review’ feasible in real time. It created a new 
arena for commentary, one that was lauded by enthusiasts. Rebecca Rosen’s (2012) news piece on the 
controversy for the ​Atlantic​ was subtitled ‘How the Internet Can Make Science Better’ and continued ‘At 
every step of the way, newer tools for conveying and analyzing science had better results than more 
traditional methods’. The response of the authors themselves was less positive about these new 
developments. They had a position that was, at the time, not uncommon: 
"​Any discourse will have to be peer-reviewed​ in the same manner as our paper was, and go through a 
vetting process so that all ​discussion is properly moderated​," wrote Felisa Wolfe-Simon of the NASA 
Astrobiology Institute. "The items you are presenting ​do not represent the proper way to engage​ in a 
scientific discourse and we will not respond in this manner." Zimmer (2010), emphasis added. 
This policing of the acceptable arenas and the rules of engagement for the peer review process is exactly 
what we would predict. Further the focus of conflict onto those rules of engagement meant that there was 
little in the way of more productive substantive conflict. In fact the online controversy may have limited 
the capacity of more traditional processes to reach a resolution. The article has not been retracted and the 
only editorial expression of concern is an Editor’s Note (Alberts, 2012) that states that ‘...the discussion 
published today is only a step in a much longer process’. The resolution of the conflict remains bounded 
within multiple different, and somewhat conflicting technical notes representing the position of multiple 
groups. Translation and abstraction to reach a consensus solution has failed. 
Although perhaps the most famous, this was not the first such case. A year earlier a similarly startling 
claim was made in a paper in the ​Journal of the American Chemical Society​ that sodium hydride could act as an 
oxidant (Wang et al, 2009). For a chemist this would mean that ‘...black was apparently now white’ as Paul 
Docherty was quoted as saying in a contemporaneous news piece by Simon Hadlington (2009). A striking 
feature of the response in this case was a rapid and productive process of defining the problems in the 
original article, identifying why the original observation was made (essentially an issue of reagent 
contamination) and indeed noting that the observation was not new, similar reactions having been 
described in much older articles (Swamer and Hauser, 1946; Lewis, 1965).  
As in the case of the arsenic DNA Docherty directly tried to replicate the findings and reported this in 
near real time on his blog (Docherty, 2010). His initial replication at least partially succeeded. However, 
this was quickly superseded by the contributions of others, pinning down the role of contaminants in the 
reaction. In this community the process was seen as largely positive. Hadlington’s (2009) news piece notes 
a generally constructive reaction to the critique, including the acceptance of contamination (the ‘..trace 
amount of air…’) from the authors: 
Wang initially remained adamant that something unusual is happening in the reaction, but later 
appeared to accept that oxygen may play a role. The following day he added: “Since we didn’t run 
the reaction in a drybox, i.e. an absolutely inert atmosphere, it is also likely that NaH plus trace 
amount of air did the oxidations through radical-type mechanism.” 
An important difference to note, also mentioned in Hadlington’s news piece is that the community sense 
was that ‘No-one is doubting that the authors of the JACS paper did make these compounds’ but that it 
was the interpretation of results that was at stake. In the arsenic case the criticisms were much more 
direct, undermining the basic claims. Nonetheless, the hydride paper was ultimately retracted. In the ​JACS 
case there was no direct attack on the arena of online criticism itself. A number of differences might 
contribute to this, the cultural nature of the disciplines, the stakes (although an article in ​JACS​ for a 
chemist at least approaches the same level of prestige as an article in ​Science​ for a biologist) and also the 
nature of the community. In 2009 relatively few chemists were online and those who were, including 
myself, were enthusiasts for the technological possibilities. By contrast, by 2010 a significant minority of 
bioscientists were engaging in various forms of online communities and these were mainstream venues for 
science journalists, many of whom had come from online communities themselves. The subject matter – a 
startling but nonetheless niche chemical process, compared to the possibility of radically different life 
forms – also engaged a larger community, and therefore one where the common elements of acceptable 
and expected process was likely to be more conservative. 
In both cases much of the conversation centred on the arena itself, in one case focussing on its 
appropriateness and in the other on its possible value as a new mode of working. Moving forward a few 
more years and we see a substantial shift. Articles published in ​Nature​ in 2014 claimed that human cells 
could be made pluripotent, that is converted into stem cells, simply by dipping them in a specific acid 
(Obokata et al., 2014a, 2014b). These “STAP” stem cells were potentially revolutionary both for 
fundamental biomedical sciences and for clinical applications. The STAP story has been examined in 
detail by Meskus at al (2017), in particular the role of two online forums, that of the Knoepfler research 
group and the online commenting platform PubPeer .  
Encouraged through the online community around the Knoepfler group website, groups sought to 
replicate the findings and much of the commentary on these (mainly unsuccessful) attempts occurred in 
public and semi-public forums online. While many researchers reserved final judgement as these 
replications were reported, there was little to no commentary on whether such online discussion was 
“appropriate”. Online discussion, after formal publication, had been normalised by this date as an 
appropriate arena for critique and ongoing review. 
However, the rules of engagement were not clear. This is moat evident in the role that the online 
discussion form PubPeer played. PubPeer offers a space for commentary, including anonymous 
commentary on research articles. It has developed a controversial reputation for its role in accusations of 
data manipulation and fraud. In this case, as Meskus et al. (2017) note an accusation of image 
manipulation was made pseudonymously. There was significant commentary on the appropriateness of 
the ​process​, and particularly the role of anonymity. PubPeer remains highly controversial, due in large part 
to an internet-style tone of accusation that is seen as out of place in a critical process that is (expected to) 
be conducted in a civil fashion (at least at the surface and in carefully defined aspects).  
Nonetheless, there were no real attacks on the idea of online discussions as an appropriate arena for 
debate. Bernd Pulverer, editor in chief of the ​EMBO Journal​ and a frequent commentator on issues of peer 
review and research ethics wrote in an editorial (Pulverer, 2014) during the height of the controversy that: 
Flagging putative image manipulation post-publication ​remains an important control mechanism​, but 
must not fall victim to an overzealous response… We know that mistakes happen all too easily as 
we try to navigate today's digital data flood. Also, there remain divergent sensitivities to allowable 
image processing and a lack of training and education. We see no reason to fundamentally 
question the veracity of the literature—we retain full trust in molecular biology research… We 
hope that a similar ethos is adopted by whistle blowers—occasional or full time, anonymous or 
open. Importantly, we must avoid judging the whole literature by today's standards. 
Note particularly that the role of the whistleblowers, even anonymous ones, is not questioned in principle. 
It is the process that is under discussion, the rules of engagement that should be followed. This is an 
institution in evolution, destabilised by technical advances, and now adapting to its new environment 
through the production of new rules in use. 
This destabilisation of the institutions protecting an arena of productive conflict would be predicted to 
lead to a greater propensity to visible, uncontrolled, violence. In the STAP Stem Cell case this reached a 
tragic conclusion with the suicide of one of the lead researchers, Yoshiki Sasai. It seems clear that the 
public nature of the controversy and the accusations played a role in this. As Hartley (2018) notes, our 
presumptions of what ‘counts’ as violence can limit our appreciation of its extent. Self harm and mental 
illness are both profound effects of hidden violence in the academy as well as of review processes. They 
deserve more attention. In this context, they are signals of institutional failure as well as individual 
tragedies. 
Bullying is another form of violence that receives less attention than it should. Online forums and 
discussions of issues ranging from mistakes to outright fraud remain dogged by accusations of bullying. 
Those pursuing what they see as breaches of research ethics are frustrated by the lack of response from 
organisations and accused researchers. Those being pursued frequently argue that they are being held to 
impossibly high standards, echoing the concern that Pulverer raises in his editorial. The calls for civility are 
a signal that the institutional rules of engagement have not successfully been set. 
Meanwhile the technology continues on apace, raising many of the same issues anew. In a more recent 
project, Michèle Nuijten and Chris Hartgerink applied software developed by Nuitjen to do simple 
statistical validity tests to tens of thousands of articles. Hartgerink posted the results of this analysis to 
PubPeer ​en masse​. Hartgerink described this as ‘...to perform something like a spell check’ (Resnick, 2016) 
while Dorothy Bishop, Professor of Developmental Neuropsychology at the University of Oxford had 
concerns (Bishop, 2016), noting: 
The tone of the PubPeer comments will, I suspect alienate many people. As I argued on Twitter, I 
found it irritating to get an email saying a paper of mine had been discussed on PubPeer, only to 
find that this referred to a comment stating that zero errors had been found in the statistics of that 
paper 
Here the focus is on the process, on the ​tone ​ to be applied. That is, on the rules of engagement. Bishop 
describes a to-and-fro with Hartgerink on Twitter in which it is clear that the discussion is an attempt to 
build the new institutional forms through public discussion. In the preface to these comments Bishop 
notes: 
[I post the comments on my own blog] … because the quotes could be interpreted as indicating I 
disapprove of the Statcheck project and am defensive about errors in my work. Neither of those is 
true. I think the project is an interesting piece of work; ​my concern is solely with the way in which feedback 
to authors is being implemented​… [emphasis added] 
There is no question here that the arena is acceptable, only of reaching an agreement on the rules to be 
applied. To suggest that that online discussions are to be rejected entirely has lost almost all its credibility, 
at least as a viable position to take in public. The shift has occurred, but the community rules are still 
moving to address the change. 
The Role of Conflict and its Institutionalisation 
I have examined a particular process of change in peer review as an example of the larger claim. The 
institutions that underpin the academic community as a whole reinforce the groupishness and tribalism of 
our disciplinary formations. At the same time they both provoke conflict, and define the arenas and form 
that it takes. My central argument is that our institutions both create and define boundaries; and at the 
same time require us to cross those boundaries. As a result, group-made knowledge is firstly able to form 
within groups and then required to be transferred and translated among groups. This contact necessarily 
creates conflict, even if stylised and controlled by staging, and it is through that staged and 
institutionalised conflict that a shared concept, i.e. generalised knowledge, is created. Peer review makes a 
particularly good example of this because we feel that conflict. We detest engaging in it, while at the same 
time seeing it as crucial for the production of scholarly outputs. We are so deeply embedded in its current 
institutional forms that suggestions that it is a recent invention are seen as a threat to our cultural identity.  
Similar patterns play out well beyond peer review. The idea of publication itself and the contested role of 
‘general science’ journals in STEM subjects illustrates both the strong boundary definition of the whole 
system – scholars have a very clear idea about what specific forms of publication count – and in its 
creation of local communities, the clubs that are defined by specific journals (Potts et al., 2017) and the 
specialisation of particular book publishers. The expectation that we must publish, aside from its recent 
coupling to peer review, is an institutionalised requirement to seek to reach beyond the boundaries of our 
local communities, the immediate research group, the niche disciplinary field to some imagined larger scale 
community. 
Shapin and Schaffer (1985) explain how Robert Boyle’s goal in his efforts to produce institutions 
including the Royal Society itself – but also of communication, the social and print technologies they 
describe – was to circumscribe an appropriate and institutionalised arena for debate. They describe how in 
the aftermath of the English Civil War, the Protectorate and the Restoration (1640s-1660s) that debate of 
truth was a fraught political issue. Boyle was seeking a materialist arena, bounded by ‘matters of fact’ that 
circumscribed a space for debate on what could be defined about the operation of matter from 
experiment. In a context where unconstrained conflict had led to years of war, continued political turmoil 
and death on a large scale, our modern assumption that disagreement is natural and acceptable was not 
clear. Shaping that arena for allowable conflict, the discussion of matters of fact and the various 
hypotheses that might explain them was a crucial political goal and our institutional forms are strongly 
influenced by that history. 
Openness as a Driver of Change 
Thus far the discussion has revolved around constraint. Change, where it occurs, has been positioned as 
the process of regaining control in the face of environmental shifts. A model built on institutions that 
define arenas of productive conflict can provide a framework for understanding internal community 
dynamics and local change. It offers a static view of how things might work. What it does not do is 
provide an argument for why these institutions have survived in the long term. 
One argument is that they have created value for society as a whole. It seems reasonable to suggest that 
knowledge produced in a system in which institutions drive generalisation and abstraction through 
translation is well suited to creating knowledge that can be translated (i.e. applied) by yet other groups and 
publics. 
On the other hand the sharp boundary that is policed between scholarly and non-scholarly work – 
between those who are members of the broad community and those who are not – would seem to 
contradict or weaken this argument. Our evolved institutions focus our efforts on internal communication 
and translation and not on translation to communities outside our own. 
The answer to this apparent paradox – that generalised knowledge is translated beyond scholarly 
communities, but we don’t value that translation and institutionalise it – may be that this is the 
largest-scale expression of the same tension that has been discussed throughout. At the scale of the whole 
scholarly/academic community we would expect the boundaries to be strongest. We are all ‘we’ and ‘the 
public’ are all ‘they’. Yet the value and level of generality to be gained by investing in translation of 
knowledge across that boundary is potentially higher than any internal process. 
If that is true, and if this larger we/they boundary is the site (or sites) of the value creation that has 
sustained our institutions over the course of centuries, then we would predict the existence of institutions 
that manage this tension. At this scale there will be deeply held principles so it may be more helpful to 
describe them as ​culture ​; fundamental tenets that underpin our scholarly identity.  There are two such 
cultural elements, that are in tension, which I believe might represent such an institutional form. They are 
openness and our identification as scholars. 
Positioning openness – at best a wooly and contested term – as an underpinning cultural feature of the 
academic community requires a deep rehistoricising of the term. John Willinsky’s (2018) recent work 
tracing the deep roots of scholarly norms in the monastic communities of the first millenium is a 
significant contribution here. He shows that norms of public communication (or as public as is practicable 
given contemporary technology) and of knowledge as property held in common are very old core 
characteristics of scholarly work.  
We can also draw on the classic work of Shapin and Schaffer in ​Leviathan and the Air Pump ​ (1985). This is 
generally seen as a critical analysis of whether Boyle lived up to the claims he was making for the (as yet 
unnamed) scientific method. But the fact that he fell short of the normative goals that he claimed for his 
project, of reproducibility, civility in criticism and openness to the public, does not necessarily invalidate 
the position that he was setting out institutional norms to be aspired to. The normative goals of shared 
culture are rarely perfectly realised in practice. That does not make them less important or defining of the 
culture. Indeed the idea of iterating towards better understanding, and more informed practice, is a core 
part of the scientific method. Without the recognition of imperfection there can be no ongoing 
requirement for correction and improvement. 
A common thread that we can draw through these cases, through the flowering in the 19th century of 
what we would now call citizen science (Dawson et al., 2015, Lightman, 2016), and the aspirations for 
global scholarship after the Second World War, is a sense that it should be possible for anyone to be 
included. There is a sense that good contributions can come from anywhere and a commitment to that 
idea as a principle. 
At the same time there is a countervailing force, that of identity and enclosure of the scholarly community. 
Identity as a scholar, with the trappings of professional recognition, institutional affiliation and above all 
adherence to the rules​ acts in an explicitly exclusionary manner. Boyle (1662) himself shows both sides of this 
in the introduction to his response to criticisms from Franciscus Linus: 
...for the Reasons specified in the Preface, I hold it not amiss to examine briefly what is objected 
against the thing I have delivered: and the rather, partly, because the Learned Author, ​whoever he be 
(for 'tis the Title-Page of his Book that first acquainted me with the name of Franciscus Linus) 
having forborne provoking Language in his Objections​, allowes me in answering them to comply with my 
Inclinations & Custom of exercising Civility, even where I most dissent in point of Judgement. 
[emphasis added] 
Boyle here belabours the point that he will address the objections of Linus despite not knowing him or his 
previous work (‘...whoever he be…’). Indeed he contrasts his willingness to engage with someone of little 
notoriety with his disinclination to directly address Thomas Hobbes, even though Hobbes is a ‘man of 
Name in the World’. At the same time Boyle is setting ground rules of appropriate civility (‘...having 
forborne provoking language’) and seriousness of intent (‘I thought the Discourses of Linus the fitter to 
be insisted on, because he seems to have more diligently [...] enquired into our Doctrine’). Normative 
tendencies to both inclusion and exclusion are simultaneously in play. 
The effects of exclusion and boundary work in scholarly communities are well established. To explain the 
production of knowledge at various scales from the local (within a single research group) through 
disciplinary communities to the whole scholarly community we need to invoke communities that exist, 
and interact, at all these different scales. This includes the largest scale,  the community of practice that 
does work which is considered to be scholarly. However, these inward facing practices can’t provide an 
argument for the production of value beyond this specific community’s boundaries. It can’t provide an 
explanation of the longevity of this culture in the context of society more widely. 
What I would claim is unique to the community of practice of scholars (in the western tradition) is this – 
necessarily vague and diffuse – commitment to openness. This commitment is seen in the idea of testing, 
it is seen in the attempts to expand the scope of the community, in the growth of the research community 
geographically, with efforts to improve communication, open access, data sharing and reproducibility. As 
with the construction and management of productive conflict across the sub-groups of the research 
community, these two countervailing cultural norms, both boundary definition and identity making of a 
community of practice ​and ​openness, continually create new conflict and tests and it is in the tension 
between these two normative tendences that value – new knowledge – is created.  
The commitment to openness is weak in practice. It is imperfectly and irregularly observed at best. The 
history of western science and scholarship is one of exclusion and bias. But as a normative aspiration, a 
‘motherhood and apple pie’ statement of scholarly practice it is still powerful and directional. It’s 
non-observance, through exclusion and boundary reinforcement is downplayed. It is taken to be a 
necessity of circumstances, not something to be lauded. If general knowledge is created in the productive 
conflict between disparate groups, then the only way it can grow is through contact with new groups. 
Openness, as an aspiration, is crucial in creating that conflict and our practice as a community, is critical in 
making it as productive as it can be. 
Institutions and Cultures of Productive Conflict 
If we accept the idea that knowledge is produced by groups and that the forms and communities of 
western scholarly knowledge production have created value, or at least shown long-term sustainability 
then it is necessary to argue that there are aspects of practice for these communities that are important to 
this sustainability. I have argued that the institutions of our scholarly communities contribute to this by 
managing a tension that both brings internal groups into contact but also reinforces their sense of separate 
identity.  
This is, in many ways, a rearticulation of social and group based models of scientific knowledge 
production based on those of Fleck and Ravetz. What this analysis adds to these models is the role of 
managed conflict. That is, the idea that this is staged, through the creation of shared, and institutionally 
defined, arenas for conflict where the rules (which are always evolving and being renegotiated) are shared 
across our broader scholarly community.  
As a social theory of knowledge production, this model makes diversity a first order principle. It is what 
underpins the generalisation and abstraction process at all scales. But at the same time, framing those 
interactions as conflicts centres the diversity challenge. For diverse communities and their representatives 
to be able to engage ​productively​ in dispute there are fundamental issues of safety and predictability that 
need to be guaranteed. Such productive conflict can only occur near the top of Maslow’s hierarchy of 
needs. 
Framing knowledge generalisation as a process of managed conflict may also help us to understand the 
dynamics of advocacy and change in our institutions. We should expect stability and conservatism in our 
institutions because they act to enforce the arenas and rules. Reform, which is demanded by an aspiration 
to openness, will always be in conflict and the processes will always be messy. But if we can frame that 
messiness as ​part​ of the rules of the game then we may make progress. 
Peer review as a shared arena for productive conflict offers a good case study. It is an evolving institution, 
under stress with the technological affordances provided by the internet and the world wide web. We can 
predict that change will be messy and contested, that it will occur more rapidly in some communities than 
in others, and that local variation will complicate wide-spread change. At the same time, if we understand 
the requirements as one of producing productive arenas for conflict to be worked through we can see 
what kinds of issues will need to be addressed. It is clear that arguments around ‘appropriate behaviour’ 
and ‘tone’ and ‘civility’ will be at the forefront. If these are understood as code for negotiation over the 
rules of engagement, with inevitable problems arising from contested history and asymmetries of power, 
then we may make more progress. 
Fundamental to this is positioning openness – albeit a challenging-to-define form of it – as a core, and 
highly conservative (i.e. sustainable) value of scholarship. This is not Tkacz’s (2012) critique of openness 
as fundamentally a reaction to the status quo. Although it is in tension with the status quo, and shares 
many of the dynamics Tkacz describes, this form of openness – an orientation towards the unexpected 
and unknown – must arise out of that status quo if it is to be productive. In its local context it will appear 
as Tkacz describes; local groups adopting new practice coming into conflict with those following the old 
rules. But at the scale of the system it is a mechanism for enabling change, ensuring contact with new 
groups and new modes of conflict. 
There is also something of the colonial in this view of openness. If it seeks the new and the challenging, 
does that not simply reflect the pith-helmet view of empire and discovery? The path dependent answer is 
likely yes, that openness to explore the new was a contributor to the evils of colonialism. Our challenge is 
to recognise that, and alongside it the idea that our goals for ​productive ​ conflict must be to benefit 
communities on both sides of any boundary. This will require new ways of thinking with openness in the 
context of Indigenous knowledge being a particularly challenging test case. 
Above all it provides a framework for critiquing our institutions and culture, and their dynamics. Our 
institutions must hold in tension stability, identity and predictability with openness and newness. They 
must be capable of evolution and of growth, even as they reach a global scale where the scale of 
coordination makes change a challenge.  
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